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Abstract 
We develop a framework to incorporate bank risk, as measured from the variance of profits or 
returns, within a model of frontier efficiency. Our framework follows the premise that risk is 
endogenously related to efficiency. We estimate our model using panel data for U.S. banks and 
Bayesian techniques. We show that excluding risk from the efficiency model significantly 
biases the efficiency estimates and the ranking of banks according to their competitive 
advantage. We also demonstrate that there is a negative risk-efficiency nexus with causality 
running both ways, while our estimates of risk are fully consistent with the developments in 
the banking industry over the period 1976-2014.      
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1. Introduction 
Is there a causal relationship between the riskiness and efficiency of banks? And if yes what is 
the direction of causality? The goal of this paper is to develop a framework that incorporates 
risk as an endogenous variable into an empirical model of operational efficiency. We use the 
well-established stochastic frontier approach (SFA), under which the stochastic term of a 
production, cost, profit, or return function is decomposed into an efficiency-related component 
and the remainder disturbance.1 We show that our framework allows the robust estimation of 
bank efficiency and risk, as well as the identification of the potency and direction in the risk-
efficiency nexus. 
 There are two novel elements of our framework. First, in line with the standard finance 
literature (e.g., Markowitz, 1952, and many others henceforth), we model risk as the variability 
of the difference between actual and expected profits (returns). In doing this, we abstain from 
including specific variables reflecting only certain aspects of risk as inputs/outputs in the 
production of banking services and allow risk to be estimated in a more thorough way. Second, 
and quite important, we allow our risk and efficiency estimates to be endogenous to each other. 
This is an essential improvement of efficiency models given the well-established theoretical 
proposition that bank risk-taking is endogenous to the characteristics of the specific banking 
firm, including managerial decision-making, and does not solely emerge out of context 
(Hughes, 1999; Danielsson and Shin, 2003).  
 Theoretically, causality between risk and efficiency can run both ways. On the one 
hand, bank managers seek new risky projects to innovate and differentiate from rival banks, as 
                                                 
1 A competitive approach to the stochastic frontier modeling framework is the use of linear programming 
techniques, mainly Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Although DEA methods have advanced to incorporate a 
stochastic structure, which was the traditional drawback relative to the SFA, the inclusion of risk in DEA remains 
quite difficult given the requirement to incorporate stochastic assumptions with respect to the volatility of returns. 
We do, however, propose in the conclusions some possible extensions to incorporate stochastic risk within a DEA 
framework. For a review in using stochastic DEA methods, see Olesen and Petersen (2016), and for DEA methods 
in banking, see Fethi and Pasiouras (2010). 
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well as manage existing risk through diversification with the ultimate goal being to increase 
their revenue (Sharpe, 1964). In contrast, banks pursuing projects with very high risk, given 
inputs and outputs of production, would experience increased risk and inability to differentiate 
so as to achieve maximum returns. Thus, we expect both positive and negative forces defining 
a relation running from risk to profit (return) efficiency.    
 Conversely, under the impulse of the prospect and the behavioral theories, banks with 
relatively low efficiency levels are likely to take very high risks. This can be due to effort to 
catch up with rival banks, slow learning or ineffective risk management, and adaptation 
(Fiordelisi et al., 2011). For the same reasons, banks with efficient risk management are likely 
to exhibit good performance as well as low risk-taking. In a similar fashion, successful 
managers seek new operational structures and technologies to improve operational efficiency 
in the cost side and contain everyday operational risk. Based on the above arguments, a 
potential negative relation between risk and return, i.e. the Bowman (1980) paradox, can also 
be studied as a risk-efficiency nexus. 
 The above theoretical arguments imply that bank efficiency and risk are endogenously 
determined. We note that most of the empirical efficiency literature does not include a risk 
component and, when it does, this risk component is neither formally modelled from the 
variance of profits nor is endogenously determined by efficiency (e.g., Dong et al., 2016; 
references therein). We empirically demonstrate that failing to do so leads to biases in the 
estimates of efficiency and the competitive advantage of banks versus one another.       
 In this paper, we extend the SFA by formally building and estimating a four-equation 
vector autoregression (VAR) model. The first equation retains the standard profit or return 
function of the SFA, while the second is a stochastic equation differentiating between actual 
and expected profits (or returns), the variance of which is our measure for risk. The third 
equation models the contemporaneous level of risk as a function of lagged efficiency (and 
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other determinants) and the fourth equation models efficiency as a function of lagged risk (and 
other determinants). Given that our model relies on quite a few latent variables (including risk 
and efficiency), we use Bayesian estimation methods organized around Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC).  
 We estimate our model using a panel of large U.S. banks that fully compete on a 
national scale over a period of almost 40 years (1976-2014). The banking industry is ideal for 
our setting, given the special role of risk, the extensive literature on SFA in banking (e.g., 
Berger, 2007; references therein), and the availability of longitudal data over a large time span. 
However, our model can be applied to any other industry for which relevant data are available.  
 Our results suggest that the average level of estimated efficiency of banks is 
significantly lower (inefficiency is higher) when we incorporate risk into the SFA. Also, the 
ranking of banks based on their level of efficiency, and thus the identification of their relative 
competitive advantage, is also significantly different from the model without risk or from the 
model where risk is exogenous. Thus, the failure to include risk into the SFA and/or treating 
risk as an endogenous variable results in erroneous inference about both the absolute level of 
efficiency and the relative competitive advantage of banks. 
 Equally important, our findings demonstrate a strong negative relationship between 
risk and efficiency running both ways (from the previous period’s risk to current levels of 
efficiency and vice versa). In this respect, our findings are consistent with the literature 
following the Bowman (1980) paradox. Our findings are also consistent with the implications 
of banking literature on important matters, such as the identification of risky periods closely 
following the historical episodes of financial turmoil and the positive effect of bank capital on 
risk.  
 Our results further motivate our paper from a managerial perspective. To the extent that 
the findings generalize to other industries, the estimation of efficiency while formally 
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incorporating risk as an endogenous variable can better inform firms that compete domestically 
or internationally about their competitive advantages and their sources. The example of the 
comparison of the U.S. and Japanese automotive industries by Chen et al. (2015) is particularly 
apt, as the risky strategic decisions of managers should offer an explanation for the divergence 
in the efficiency of the two industries. This line of research should also have important 
implications for recent endeavors to measure the efficiency of the public sector (e.g., Doumpos 
and Cohen, 2013; Haelermans and Ruggiero, 2013; Galariotis et al., 2016), energy sector (e.g., 
Fragkiadakis et al. (2016), as well as for cases in which some of the outputs impose negative 
social externalities (e.g., Chen and Delmas, 2012). 
 Our work is also related to a strand of finance literature suggesting that any 
measurement of risk should consider its endogeneity (Danielsson and Shin, 2003; Brunnermeir 
and Sannikov, 2014; Delis et al., 2015). This literature stresses that the consideration of risk as 
exogenous within any market or industry and across different measures (e.g., from simple 
accounting ratios, the net present value calculated by the discounted cash flow method or 
economic value added, and/or value-at-risk models) produces erroneous estimates and 
inferences. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and further 
motivates our model. Section 3 discusses the empirical application to the banking industry and 
presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper.       
 
2. The framework 
2.1. Profit and return efficiency 
The estimation of firms’ operational efficiency is a very popular practice in the operations 
research and economics literatures (e.g., Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). The merit of frontier efficiency measures compared to the traditional 
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accounting-based measures of firm performance is that the former can identify the competitive 
advantage of a firm vis-à-vis its competitors (see the extensive discussion by Chen et al., 2015). 
In turn, the robust identification of competitive advantage and its sources (from e.g., superior 
cost management or profitable innovation) has unique implications for managerial efficiency, 
goals, and strategies. 
 The most comprehensive measures of frontier efficiency, and the ones used here, are 
based on profit or return on investment (also called return to outlay). The reason is that these 
measures incorporate both revenue effects (of producing at inefficient levels) and cost effects 
(of producing using an inefficient input mix). Under the assumption that firms maximize 
profits given a production set, the objective function of the firm is: 
 𝛱(𝑦, 𝑤) =  max
(𝑥,𝑝)
: {𝑝′𝑦 − 𝑤′𝑥}.       (1) 
In (1), Π is the profit level of a firm at a specific point in time. In turn, x and y denote vectors 
of inputs and outputs of production, with their prices being the vectors 𝑤 and 𝑝, respectively. 
This is the alternative profit function (e.g., Lozano-Vivas, 1997), which assumes that firms 
maximize profits by adjusting output prices and input quantities (as opposed to output and 
input quantities under the standard profit function). The main reason that this function has 
become popular in empirical research is the relative lack of information on output prices, 
especially for multi-output firms. However, an important merit of this approach is that it also 
allows for the estimation of profit (or return) functions in industries that deviate from perfect 
competition (Berger and Mester, 1997; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Lozano-Vivas, 
1997).  
 The objective function in (1) assumes that all firms produce at an optimal (ideal) profit 
frontier. Of course, this assumption is quite problematic because all firms produce with some 
level of inefficiency on either the cost or revenue side. To identify the level of inefficiency, the 
usual practice (e.g., Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) is to estimate an equation of the form: 
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 log 𝛱𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡,          (2) 
where 𝑥′𝑖𝑡 is the vector of outputs and input prices of firm i at time t, β are technology 
parameters to be estimated, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the stochastic disturbance, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  ≥ 0 is a one-sided error 
term representing profit inefficiency. Profit efficiency can then be simply calculated as 
exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡). This model is usually termed the SFA to firm efficiency measurement. 
 Instead of assuming that firms maximize profit, we can assume that firms maximize 
return on investments. This assumption might be more intuitive from a managerial viewpoint 
because managers are primarily interested not in the absolute level of profit but in the 
evaluation of the ability of their investments to generate profits. The formal model considers 
the maximization of the following objective value function: 
 𝑉(𝑝, 𝑤) =  max
(𝑥,𝑦)
: {
𝑝′𝑦
𝑤′𝑥
},        (3) 
where V = total revenue/ total cost and the rest are as in equation (1). As opposed to (1), 
equation (3) has the additional merit of being non-negative, which is important for the 
estimation because taking logs of profits in (2) can be problematic when firms are in fact 
realizing losses. Equation (3) is homogeneous of degree one in all prices, non-decreasing in 𝑝, 
and non-increasing in 𝑤. The equivalent of (2) as a return function is obtained simply by 
replacing Π with V in (2) and, for expositional brevity, we only provide the model for profits.  
 
2.2. Endogenous risk in the model of efficiency 
The basic SFA analyzed above does not consider the formal inclusion of a risk component. A 
number of studies, especially in the banking industry where risk deserves special attention 
(e.g., Mester, 1996; Hughes, 1999), recognize this omission and consider risk in the estimation 
of efficiency models via the inclusion of specific risk-related variables in the objective function 
of the bank along with inputs, outputs, and associated prices. This practice is, of course, correct 
provided that one or a finite number of risk measures (e.g., capital, non-performing loans, etc.) 
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fully control for the riskiness of the bank. Here, we instead propose the estimation of risk 
within the SFA from the variability of profits or returns, in a manner fully consistent with 
management, finance, and economics theory (since at least Markowitz, 1952).  
 Even more notably, this paper represents the first effort to consider the potential 
endogeneity between risk and efficiency within the well-established SFA. Theoretically, the 
relation between risk and efficiency in banking can go both ways. To make profits and create 
value for the banking firm, bank managers seek investments with the highest possible net 
present value and manage risk in their portfolios to achieve a maximum. Thus, both the level 
of risk and risk-diversification ability affect the future efficiency and performance of the bank 
and this is the essence of the well-established positive risk-returns relation (Sharpe, 1964). 
Further, banks seek to attract new customers and achieve monopolistically competitive profits 
through risky product innovation and differentiation from competition. Achieving these 
objectives given a fixed set of inputs and input prices, would also imply that these banks will 
appear more efficient in the future period.  
 A relation running from risk to efficiency can, however, be negative due to two main 
mechanisms. The first is the presence of a shock that increases bank risk exogenously (what 
Berger and DeYoung, 1997, refer to as the “bad luck hypothesis”). In this case, the increased 
risk emerges from increases in non-performing assets (loans and securities), the limited ability 
to securitize or sell these assets, and increases in adverse selection (concerning the screening 
of new projects) and moral hazard (monitoring of existing projects). Second, the prospect and 
behavioral theories posit that firms with low performance (low profit and return efficiency in 
our case) might seek higher risks in an effort to catch up with competition, while firms with 
high performance exhibit low risks due to competent risk-management (e.g., Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas, 2004). More recently, Andersen and Bettis (2015) suggest that this negative relation 
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can be due to “low-learning” or “mindless” behavior of firms. These theories emerged as the 
main explanations for the Bowman (1980) paradox (i.e., the negative risk-return nexus). 
 Causality, however, might run from efficiency to risk, with at least two theories 
pointing to such direction (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Berger and De Young, 1997). First, the “bad 
management hypothesis” posits that bad monitoring and screening capabilities of inefficient 
banks, along with poor cost and asset management result in higher overall risk. On the same 
line, efficient bank managers seek new operational structures and technologies both in the asset 
(revenue) and the liability (cost) side of their balance sheet, and this leads to improved risk 
monitoring and lower probability of default. Second, the “cost skimping hypothesis” suggests 
that banks might achieve low costs by under-spending on loan underwriting and monitoring in 
the short run, and in the longer run this yields higher non-performing loans in particular and 
increased probability of bank default in general. Based on the above arguments, we expect that 
banks with higher efficiency exhibit lower overall risk.  
 To formally incorporate risk into the SFA, we augment (2) as follows: 
 log 𝛱𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡,        (4) 
 𝛱𝑖𝑡 = 𝛱𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.         (5) 
In (5), the difference between Π and Π* represents the deviation of the actual from expected 
profits ε of firms, where ε is distributed as 𝛮(0, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2).2 Using the implications of standard finance 
and management theory (e.g., Delis et al., 2015; and references therein), we define the variance 
of profits σ2 as the risk of firm i at time t. By modeling return on investments instead of profit, 
we can alternatively obtain the equivalent variance of returns as our measure of risk. 
 This modelling choice assumes that risk (σ2) is a latent variable and not an input or 
output of production as in the previous literature. This approach has three main advantages. 
                                                 
2 The assumption of normal distribution can be criticized on the basis of skewness or kurtosis, as in the risk-return 
relation (e.g., Theodossiou and Savva, 2016). We show below that, at least in our empirical application, this does 
not cause considerable problems. However, we also highlight that the potential use of e.g. a skewed generalized 
distribution (Theodossiou, 1998) is a quite fruitful extension.   
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First, the variability of profits or returns, as directly estimated from the profit or returns 
function, is a more thorough measure of total bank risk compared to specific accounting ratios 
entering the production function of the bank that separately reflect credit risk, liquidity risk, 
etc. in a non-exhaustive way. To this end, our approach is consistent with the modern portfolio 
theory (Markowitz, 1952; Boyd and Runkle, 1993) and its extensions in more thoroughly 
measuring total bank risk. Second, our framework allows the direct estimation of risk at each 
bank-year observation from the data and not from the volatility of profits or returns using 
backward information (lags) on these variables (e.g., Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Laeven and 
Levine, 2009). We view this as an important advantage, because using information from 
previous periods yields a measure of risk that is sensitive to the number of chosen periods and 
is problematic if data frequency is low (most studies in banking use annual data). Third, in line 
with our theoretical considerations on the endogenous relation between risk and efficiency, we 
show below that our framework can be extended to treating risk as an endogenous latent 
variable. 
 Specifically, we augment equations (4) and (5) with an equation modelling risk as an 
endogenous latent variable. Models of volatility come in a variety of forms (see, e.g., Chib et 
al., 2002), and here we use the following specification:3 
 log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  = 𝛼𝑜1 + 𝛼1 log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾1 log 𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝛿1 + 𝜂1 log 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐1,𝑖𝑡,                (6) 
In (6), z′ is a vector of other variables potentially affecting risk, 𝑐1 is the stochastic disturbance, 
and 𝛼𝑜1, 𝛼1, 𝛾1, 𝛿1, and 𝜂1 are parameters to be estimated. Effectively, we model the variance 
of profits or returns, which follows a panel stochastic volatility structure and depends on past 
inefficiency.  
                                                 
3 We prefer the log specification for reasons of symmetry with the translog. Using a linear specification produces 
very similar results.  
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 The model of equations (4)-(6) is robust as long as the inefficiency component u is not 
affected by the risk component. To allow an examination of causality in the relationship 
between risk and efficiency running both ways, we model inefficiency as: 4 
log 𝑢𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼𝑜2 + 𝛼2 log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾2 log 𝛱𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝛿2 + 𝜂2 log 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑐2,𝑖𝑡,         (7) 
where 𝛼𝑜2, 𝛼2, 𝛾2, 𝛿2, and 𝜂2 are parameters to be estimated and 𝑐2 is the disturbance. 
Equation (7) assumes that profit inefficiency is determined by the same variables as risk 
(although the vector z can contain different variables) and, importantly, the lagged risk itself. 
If 𝛼2 ≠ 0, then risk has a systematic effect on profit inefficiency. Other determinants of 
inefficiency may have an effect through the parameters in 𝛿2, and persistence in inefficiency 
is allowed for by the parameter 𝜂2. Both of these effects are crucial because they allow 
modelling inefficiency (much like risk in equation 6) as a function of a number of variables 
external to the managerial practices of firms, which is in line with a large literature on the 
determinants of efficiency (see e.g., Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010). This model is 
essentially a VAR between the two latent variables (𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  and 𝑢𝑖𝑡).  
 
2.3. Econometric estimation 
We specify all profit and return functions (i.e., equation 4) using the translog, which is the 
most frequently employed functional form in the relevant literature due to its nice mathematical 
properties and flexibility (e.g., Pasiouras et al., 2009). The econometric estimation of our 
model is conducted with maximum likelihood Bayesian techniques and associated inference 
organized around MCMC. To avoid overburdening the reader with technical estimation details, 
we move all these to the Appendix.5  
                                                 
4 The log formulation is used because 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is one-sided and treating it as such in the context of a VAR is more 
demanding in the estimation of this function below.  
5 Estimations are conducted using Fortran with extensive use of the NAG compiler, and all modules are available 
to the readers in an online supplement and in the personal website of the corresponding author. We should note 
that the modelling framework presented in the Appendix is our own work and specific to the estimation of 
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 Despite the complexity of the Bayesian methods relative to conventional maximum 
likelihood that is used in the SFA literature (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000), our approach is 
preferred for two main reasons. First, our model includes dynamic latent variables, a fact that 
renders estimation with the usual maximum likelihood techniques completely impractical (if 
not impossible). Second, taking logs of profits can be particularly problematic if the firm is 
actually realizing losses because the observations with losses will be dropped.6 Note that for 
the profit efficiency model above, the negative-profits problem is overcome if we assume that 
profit expectations Π* are always positive within the Bayesian framework and simulated with 
MCMC. If this assumption is considered too strong, then the return efficiency model is clearly 
the preferred one because V in equation (3) is always positive.  
           
3. Risk and efficiency in the U.S. banking industry 
Our model can be applied to any industry, given data availability. Here, we use data from the 
U.S. banking industry. The banking industry is an ideal setting given the importance of the 
risky decisions of banks for their efficiency and the endogenous determination of the two. For 
example, banks with very low or very high levels of risky loans will be inefficient in the sense 
that they do not produce the optimal level of risky loans. Similarly, banks that misprice the 
riskiness of loans will be inefficient on the revenue side of their profit or return function. The 
banking industry is also ideal given the availability of data over a long time period, allowing 
the robust identification of the risk-efficiency nexus. 
                                                 
equations (4)-(6). Previous studies using Bayesian methods to estimate stochastic frontier models are quite 
frequent (e.g., Van den Broeck et al., 1994; Tsionas, 2002; Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004).  
6 The usual practice in the literature is to add to all observations a constant larger than the maximum value of 
losses in the sample, thereby rescaling all profits to be positive. However, this approach is subject to substantial 
criticism because it biases the standard error and the inefficiency component of the regression. 
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 We collect accounting bank-year (end-of-year) data from the Reports of Condition and 
Income (Call Reports) over the period 1976-2014.7 We consider a relatively homogenous panel 
of commercial banks by restricting our sample to only the large ones (top 10% in terms of total 
assets) that operate and compete nationally. Our final working sample after further cleaning 
the data to eliminate objectionable values (negative total assets) and banks that ceased 
operations (due to M&As, failures or liquidations) consists of 15,922 bank-year observations. 
 In Table 1, we report summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
To define the inputs and outputs for the banking production process we use the intermediation 
approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977; Pasiouras et al., 2009), which considers the financial 
assets of banks as outputs of production and financial liabilities and physical factors as inputs. 
Specifically, as bank outputs, we use the logs of total loans (y1) and total securities (y2). The 
inputs and associated prices include the fixed assets and their price (expenditures on fixed 
assets divided by premises and fixed assets), labor and its unit price (personnel salaries divided 
by the number of full-time equivalent employees), and borrowed funds and their price (interest 
expenses on deposits and interest expenses on fed funds divided by the sum of total deposits 
and fed funds purchased). We also include in equations (4), (6), and (7) the ratio of equity 
capital to total assets (EQ/TA) to control for bank capitalization and a time trend.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 For logV, we use total bank revenue (total income before taxes) to total cost (total 
operating cost). For the logΠ*, which needs to be positive, we use simulated data from the 
Bayesian MCMC technique (see Appendix). The issue here is to choose the correct values of 
Π* in the conditioning. The problem occurs in many other cases with so-called random effect 
models or models with missing data, which makes the Bayesian framework an ideal setting. 
                                                 
7 We collect data for commercial banks only. Data for the period up to 2011 are from 
https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/commercial-bank-data. From 2011 onward 
data are from https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/PWS/DownloadBulkData.aspx.  
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Given our data set (D) and parameter γ in equations (6) and (7), if we manage to draw from the 
posterior conditional distributions (γ|Π*, D) and (Π*|γ, D), then effectively, we have a set of 
(correlated) draws from the joint posterior (γ, Π*|D). By retaining the draws for γ, we have 
draws from the posterior marginal (γ|D), which is the central object of interest.  
  
3.1. Empirical results 
Before we estimate our model, we use the standard SFA and translog alternative profit and 
return functions to estimate equation (2) without risk. We use the well-established method of 
Battese and Coelli (1995), which allows the inclusion of EQ/TA as a determinant of 
inefficiency (in the fashion that we also favor in our models). The results show that the average 
bank inefficiency from the profit model is 10.3%, distributed with a standard deviation of 
0.018. The equivalent average efficiency estimated from the return model is 15.2%, distributed 
with a standard deviation of 0.027.8 Also, the coefficient estimate on EQ/TA as determinant of 
inefficiency equals 0.142 (0.041) in the profit (return) model and in both cases is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. We use these findings as benchmark to infer the importance of 
modeling risk within the SFA.  
 Turning to our modelling framework, we first estimate a simple stochastic frontier 
model equations (4)-(6) using the profit and return models. In Table 2 we report the posterior 
mean and standard deviation from these estimations. For expositional brevity, we only report 
the results for (6) because the parameter estimates of the translog profit function are too 
numerous to report and do not provide any substantial insights. The posterior mean and 
standard deviation represent the mean and the standard deviation of the densities of each 
parameter estimate conditional on the data. These results can be interpreted in a similar fashion 
                                                 
8 It is quite impractical to report the full set of results from the translog specification (a very large number of 
estimates from the main and interactive terms of the translog), which also do not offer any important intuition for 
our purposes. These results are thus available on request. 
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to the coefficient estimates and standard errors of the conventional econometric models. We 
cannot, however, directly speak about the level of statistical significance of coefficient 
estimates and we abstain from doing so in the discussion of our results (Lee et al., 2003).  
 The model fits the data reasonably well, with most of the variables included as 
determinants of risk in equation (6) strongly explaining it. Also, all models easily pass the 
Jarque-Bera test for normality, indicating that the effect of skewness and kurtosis in the form 
considered by Theodossiou and Savva (2016) is less potent in our data set. This might be due 
to the fact that we allow for skewness in equation (6) by including log expected profits and 
covariates zit. Also, the system of equations (6) and (7) incorporates uit and ui,t-1, which is part 
of the error term, and this further reduces the effect of skewness.   
 The mean level of inefficiency is 14.7% for the profit model and 17.1% for the return 
model. Compared to the model without risk, inefficiency is higher and has a wider variance.9 
Additionally, Spearman’s rank correlation between the two models (the degree to which the 
ranking of banks from the two models is the same) is statistically significant but not quite high 
(0.13). These are first-hand evidence that a failure to include risk results in significant 
downward biases in the estimates of inefficiency and misleading guidance with respect to 
which bank has a competitive advantage over another. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 The parameter estimates reported in Table 2 and their signs are intuitive. A value of the 
parameter estimate on the lagged component of risk between zero and one implies that the 
volatility of profits persists but will eventually return to its normal (average) level. A value on 
this term close to zero implies a high speed of adjustment, while a value close to one implies 
                                                 
9 We note that the variance of inefficiency is relatively small in the return model and very small in the profit 
model. This is a first indication that the return model yields more appealing results. However, the small variance 
comes from the use of a sample of very large banks. In companion research we use all banks (not only the limited 
sample for large banks) and the variance is almost 10 times as much. Thus, the result in the variance of the 
inefficiency component is sample-driven and concerns the similarity of the banks used in the sample.  
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very slow adjustment. Given the posterior mean estimates of 0.214 and 0.121 for the profit and 
the return models, risk is only moderately persistent, all else being equal. Further, a 10% 
increase in profit (return) inefficiency in the previous period is associated with a 3.2% (5.1%) 
increase in the volatility of profits (returns). This is first-hand evidence for a negative nexus 
between inefficiency and risk (positive between efficiency and risk), which we analyze in more 
detail below.  
 Finally, the effect of the equity to assets ratio is not strongly related to the volatility of 
either profits or returns (low posterior mean relative to the posterior standard deviation). This 
contradicts the standard finding in the banking literature that banks with higher capital are 
more risky due to a moral hazard mechanism, which holds that increasing capital requirements 
constitute a means of reducing bank managers’ perceptions of the risk of default and increase 
risk-taking (e.g., Jokipii and Milne, 2011; Delis et al., 2015).   
 The results from the estimation of equations (4)-(6) cannot infer anything substantial 
about the direction of causality from risk to efficiency because inefficiency is not endogenous 
to risk. To study the interplay between risk and efficiency we estimate the VAR model of 
equations (4)-(7) and report the results in Tables 3 and 4 for the profit and return models, 
respectively.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 A striking result is that the mean inefficiency level of banks further diverges between 
the profit and return models (11.7% and 18.5%, respectively) compared to the results in Table 
2 and the model without risk. Intuitively, the mere fact that the VAR model has more structure, 
by imposing interdependence between risk and inefficiency, should in principle imply higher 
values of inefficiency (as inefficiency additionally depends on risk). This provides a strong 
indication in favor of the results of the return model (the mean inefficiency in Table 3 is 
actually lower than the equivalent of Table 2) compared to the profit model. Further, the 
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Spearman correlation coefficient between the VAR return model and the equivalent benchmark 
model without risk is as low as 0.10, which provides a strong indication of the importance of 
the inclusion of risk to robustly identify the competitive advantage of one bank versus another.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Importantly, both the profit and the return models predict that the lagged level of the 
inefficiency component has a strong positive impact on the current level of risk and that the 
lagged level of risk has a strong positive impact on the current level of inefficiency. Thus, we 
find a negative risk-efficiency nexus running both ways. Our estimates are also economically 
significant. According to our preferred return model, a 10% increase in the lagged inefficiency 
leads to a 5.6% increase in σ2. Also, a 10% increase in the lagged risk leads to a 3.1% increase 
in inefficiency. Thus, risk is more responsive to inefficiency than inefficiency is to risk. 
 Our finding on the negative risk-efficiency nexus is in line with the Bowman (1980) 
paradox and consistent with the findings of e.g. Andersen and Bettis (2015).   By distinguishing 
between the upside and the downside variance of profits, we further note that most of the 
negative risk-efficiency nexus is attributable to the downside variance (approximately 86% of 
the estimate), which is risk stemming from decreasing profits. Moreover, our sample consists 
of large banks and, thus, our result is in line with the literature suggesting a bell-shaped effect 
of bank size on performance (e.g., Avramidis et al., 2016). The premise of this literature is that 
banks experience diseconomies of scale or scope after reaching a very large size and this 
negatively affects their performance. In a nutshell, our empirical findings are mostly consistent 
with the prospect and behavioral theories of the risk-return nexus, suggesting that inefficient 
banks either take on very high levels of risk in an effort to catch up with more efficient rival 
banks or their inherent inefficiency (due to e.g. large size in our sample) leads to risk 
mismanagement. Either way, the result is an inefficiently high level of risk, which will in turn 
further increase inefficiency in the following period.   
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 Another interesting finding is the positive nexus between equity capital and both risk 
and inefficiency in the VAR return model, which we did not identify in the results of Table 2. 
The positive effect of capital on risk is consistent with the prediction of moral hazard theory, 
suggesting that the managers of well-capitalized banks seek higher levels of risk in search for 
yield (Jokipii and Milne, 2011; Delis et al., 2015). This is intuitive because banks facing higher 
capital requirements are forced to hold more capital on their balance sheets instead of using 
capital for more productive and profitable purposes.   
 Perhaps more important, Figure 1 shows the time evolution (annual mean estimates) of 
the downside variance of profits and returns. The findings are consistent with the history of 
financial turbulence in the U.S. The first small peak is around the early 1980s recession. 
Subsequently, our preferred return model indicates a short-lived peak around the Black 
Monday stock market crash in 1987, with risk remaining relatively high around the credit 
crunch in the early 1990s. The model also identifies the increased volatility around the Russian 
debt crisis, the dot-com bubble, and September 11 in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Finally, 
the annual mean estimates of the return model capture the substantial increase in bank risk 
related to the subprime crisis as early as 2005. In fact, the level of risk during the subprime 
crisis was by far the highest in our 1975-2014 sample period, a result in line with the 
perceptions of the depth of the subprime crisis and the toll that it took on the U.S. economy in 
general and banks in particular. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 We intentionally keep the analysis presented in the paper short to highlight our baseline 
results. However, we did conduct a series of sensitivity tests on the VAR model. First, we add 
more variables as z in equations (6) and (7). We experiment with more than 20 variables 
characterizing bank size, liquidity, earnings management, and the competitive environment of 
banks. Second, we experiment with the Fourier and Leontief flexible functional forms for 
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equation (4). The results from the above exercises (reported in Appendix C) are strikingly 
similar with those in Tables 3 and 4. Third, we add more lags for risk and inefficiency in 
equations (6) and (7). We find that this increases computational burden, whereas most of the 
higher lags do not seem to be important determinants of risk and inefficiency. 
 
4. Conclusions and managerial implications 
We build and estimate a stochastic frontier model that formally includes risk. The novel 
features of our model are that (i) risk is estimated from the variance of profits or returns and 
(ii) risk and efficiency are both endogenously determined as a function of each other. We apply 
the model to the U.S. banking sector (large banks) over a period of 40 years.  
 Our results have a number of managerial implications. First, we demonstrate that 
efficiency models that do not include a measure of risk, as estimated from the volatility of 
returns, produce a significant downward bias in the average level of inefficiency and a bias in 
the ranking of banks based on their efficiency levels. The latter is particularly important for 
correctly identifying the ranking of banks by their competitive advantage.  
 Second, there is a clear trade-off between risk and efficiency that is primarily 
attributable to banks with decreasing levels of efficiency (downside variance of risk). This 
trade-off goes both ways, with larger levels of inefficiency in the previous period yielding 
higher risk in the current period (which is the most potent effect) and higher risk in the previous 
period yielding higher inefficiency in the current period. Managers should be well aware of 
this trade-off, especially when they observe a downsizing of their efficiency levels, to avoid 
further future efficiency losses.    
 Third, the efficiency and risk estimates are intuitive and theoretically apt when risk and 
inefficiency are endogenous with respect to one another. For example, our risk estimates 
stemming from the return model are fully in line with the episodes of adverse developments in 
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the U.S. banking sector over the last 40 years. These estimates even show how much higher 
was the average realized riskiness of the banking sector before and after the subprime crisis 
compared to other systemic events in the 1980s and 1990s.    
 An obvious extension of our work is to apply our model to other industries and compare 
the findings with those provided in our analysis of the banking sector. We predict that the 
findings will be very similar, provided that the sample includes homogenous and directly 
competitive firms. When working in this direction, we expect to encounter data sets where the 
normality assumption in the distribution of risk does not hold. Thus, it is imperative to extend 
our model in the direction proposed by Theodossiou and Savva (2016) and use alternative 
distributions such as the skewed generalized. Finally, our research opens up the possibility to 
introduce risk within a stochastic DEA model (e.g., Simar and Zelenyuk, 2011). This can be 
done in a multi-stage setting, including a non-parametric stochastic frontier framework that 
incorporates risk as per our analysis, a data generating process to transform data, and a DEA 
procedure on the transformed data. As our paper already covers considerable ground, we leave 
these proposals as a desideratum for future research. 
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Appendix A. Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods 
Part A 
In this appendix, we specify the technical details of the MCMC around the basic risk and 
efficiency model. Consider the model 
log Π𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (A.1) 
where Π𝑖𝑡 = Π𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, with 𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝜎𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2). The specification of the volatility equation is: 
log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼 log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑤
2 ), and 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 can be Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ , Π𝑖,𝑡−1 or log 𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1. Also, 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
other predetermined variables. 
 The model can be written as: 
log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼 log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝜃𝜎
′ 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡  (A.2) 
or 
log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼 log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝑤𝑖𝑡    (A.3) 
Since 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 contains the observed variables Π𝑖,𝑡−1 or log 𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1, these variables can be 
effectively treated as predetermined. The latent variables in this model are Π𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑢𝑖𝑡, and 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 . 
The structural parameters are 𝜃 = (𝛽, 𝜎𝑣, 𝜎𝑢, 𝛼0, 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜎𝑤).  
 Let 𝜃𝜎 = (𝛼0, 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝛿) be the parameter vector in the stochastic volatility equation. All 
error terms (𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑣𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡) are assumed independent of 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑧𝑖𝑡. Assuming 𝜃𝜎 ∈ ℛ
𝐾𝜎 , we 
adopt the following priors: 
𝛽~𝒩𝐾(?̅?, ?̅?𝛽)      (A.4) 
𝜃𝜎~𝒩𝐾𝜎(?̅?𝜎 , ?̅?𝜃𝜎)  
𝑝(𝜎𝑗) ∝ 𝜎𝑗
−(?̅?𝑗+1)exp (−
?̅?𝑗
2𝜎𝑗
2)  
where 𝑗 ∈ {𝑣, 𝑢, 𝑤} and ?̅?𝑗 , ?̅?𝑗 are prior hyper parameters. Moreover, ?̅? and ?̅?𝜎 denote the prior 
means of 𝛽 and ?̅?𝜎, and ?̅?𝛽 and ?̅?𝜃𝜎 denote the prior covariance matrices for these parameters. 
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Conditional posterior of 𝜷 
Given Π𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝜎𝑤, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡, we can show that: 
𝛽|Π𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝜎𝑏 , 𝑢𝑗 , Π, 𝑋~N(?̂?, ?̂?𝛽)    (A.5) 
where ?̂? = (𝑋′𝑋 + 𝜎𝑁
2?̅?𝛽
−1)
−1
(𝑋′Π̃∗ + 𝜎𝑁
2?̅?𝛽
−1?̅?). 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝝈𝝊 
Given Π𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑢𝑖𝑡, and 𝛽, we have that: 
(Π̃∗−𝑋𝛽)
′
(Π̃∗−𝑋𝛽)+?̅?𝑁
𝜎𝑣
2 |Π
∗, 𝑢, 𝛽, Π, 𝑋~𝜒2(𝑛𝑇 + ?̅?𝑣)  (A.6) 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝒖𝒊𝒕 
Given Π𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝛽, 𝜎𝜐, the 𝑢′𝑖𝑡𝑠 are conditionally independent in the posterior and we have: 
𝑢𝑖𝑡|Π
∗, 𝛽, 𝜎𝑣, Π, 𝑋~𝑁+(−
𝑟′𝑖𝑡𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑁
2 +𝜎𝑢
2 ,
𝜎𝑉
2𝜎𝑢
2
𝜎𝑉
2+𝜎𝑢
2)   (A.7) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = log Π𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽. 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝜽𝝈 
Given 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  and 𝜎𝑤
2  we have: 
𝜃𝜎|. ~𝒩𝐾𝜎(𝜃𝜎 , ?̂?𝜃𝜎)     (A.8) 
where 𝜃𝜎 = (𝑋
′𝑋 + 𝜎𝜔
2 ?̅?𝜃𝜎
−1)(𝑋′𝑋 log 𝜃2 + 𝜎𝜔
2 𝑉𝜃𝜎
−1?̅?𝜎) and ?̂?𝜃𝜎 = 𝜎𝑢
2(𝑋′𝑋 + 𝜎𝜔
2 ?̅?𝜃𝜎
−1)
−1
. 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝝈𝒗
𝟐 
We can show that 
(log 𝜎2−𝑄′𝜃𝜎)
′(log 𝜎2−𝑄′𝜃𝜎)+?̅?𝑤
𝜎𝑤
2 |. ~𝜒
2(𝑛𝑇 + ?̅?𝑤)   (A.9) 
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where 𝑄 = [𝑄𝑖𝑡; 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇]. Drawing random numbers from (A.5)-(A.9) is 
straightforward. To draw from the posterior conditional distributions of Π𝑖𝑡
∗  and 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  is more 
involved. For this purpose let us consider the full kernel distribution: 
𝑝(𝜃, Π∗, log 𝜎2 , 𝑢|Π, 𝑋) ∝ 𝜎𝑣
−𝑛𝑇𝜎𝑢
−𝑛𝑇𝜎𝑤
−𝑛𝑇𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑣
2 ∑ ∑ (log Π𝑖𝑡
∗ +𝑢𝑖𝑡−𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽)
2𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
  (A.10) 
𝑒− ∑ ∑ log Π𝑖𝑡
∗𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 ∑ ∑ ( Π𝑖𝑡−Π𝑖𝑡
∗ )2𝑇𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where the terms 𝑒− ∑ ∑ log Π𝑖𝑡
∗𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1  and 𝑒− ∑ ∑ log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1  come from the Jacobian of 
transformation. 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝜫𝒊𝒕
∗  
It is convenient to define ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔Π𝑖𝑡
∗ , so that from (A.10) we can obtain the following 
conditional posterior: 
𝑝(ℎ𝑖𝑡|. ) ∝ 𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑣
2(ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑟𝑖𝑡)
2−ℎ𝑖𝑡−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 (Π𝑖𝑡+𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡)
2
   (A.11) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽. The distribution does not belong to any known family. Since the tail 
behavior is determined by the first two terms in the exponential, which lead to a normal 
distribution if we employ completion of square, we use the following strategy.  
 Prepare a draw ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ~𝒩(−(𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑣
2), 𝜎𝑣
2). If the current draw is ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑜  we accept the 
proposed draw with a Metropolis-Hastings probability given by: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 {1,
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 (Π𝑖𝑡+𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗
)
2
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 (Π𝑖𝑡+𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑜
)
2}    (A.12) 
A useful result is that if Π𝑖𝑡 < 0 then (A.10) is always log-concave and the derivatives of the 
conditional log-posterior are: 
𝑑
𝑑ℎ
log 𝑝(ℎ|. ) = −
1
𝜎𝑣2
(ℎ + 𝑟𝑖𝑡) − 1 +
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2
(Π𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒
ℎ)𝑒ℎ 
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𝑑2
𝑑ℎ2
log 𝑝(ℎ|. ) = −
1
𝜎𝑣2
+
1
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2
(Π𝑖𝑡 + 2𝑒
ℎ)𝑒ℎ 
For the cases where Π𝑖𝑡 < 0, log-concavity may be used to craft a better proposed distribution 
ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ~𝒩(ℎ̂𝑖𝑡, 𝜎∗
2), where 
𝑑
𝑑ℎ
log 𝑝( ℎ̂𝑖𝑡|. ) = 0 and 
1
2𝜎∗
2 = −
𝑑2
𝑑ℎ2
log 𝑝(ℎ|. ). Since in our sample 
the cases with negative profit are relatively few, we did not pursue further this approach, 
although it could prove essential in terms of numerical efficiency in other data sets, where 
losses were exclusively observed. 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝝈𝒊𝒕
𝟐  
From (A.10) and using ℎ𝑖𝑡 = log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , we obtain the following conditional posterior 
distribution: 
𝑝(ℎ𝑖𝑡|. ) ∝ 𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑤
2 (ℎ𝑖𝑡−𝑎0−𝑎ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1−𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿)
2
−ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑤
2 (ℎ𝑖𝑡−𝑎0−𝑎ℎ𝑖,𝑡−𝑧𝑖,𝑡+1
′ 𝛿)
2
𝑒
−
𝑞𝑖𝑡
2exp (ℎ𝑖𝑡) (A.13) 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑡 = (Π𝑖𝑡 − Π𝑖𝑡
∗ )2.  The first two derivatives of the log-posterior in (A.11) are as 
follows: 
𝑑
𝑑ℎ
log 𝑝( ℎ|. ) = −
1
𝜎𝑤2
{𝐵𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝑎)ℎ} +
𝑞𝑖𝑡
2
𝑒−ℎ − 1 
𝑑2
𝑑ℎ2
log 𝑝(ℎ|. ) = −
1
𝜎𝑤2
(1 − 𝑎) −
𝑞𝑖𝑡
2
𝑒−ℎ 
Thus, the distribution is log-concave for 𝑎 < 1 where: 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′  
𝐵𝑖𝑡 = ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑎0 + 𝑧𝑖,𝑡+1
′ 𝛿 
Our strategy is to draw a proposal ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ~𝒩(ℎ̂𝑖𝑡, 𝜎∗
2), where 
𝑑
𝑑ℎ
log 𝑝( ℎ̂𝑖𝑡|. ) = 0 and 
1
2𝜎∗
2 =
−
𝑑2
𝑑ℎ2
log 𝑝(ℎ̂𝑖𝑡|. ). If the current draw is ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑜 , then the proposal is accepted using the 
Metropolis-Hastings probability: 
min {1,
𝑝(ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ |.)/𝑓𝑁(ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ ;ℎ̂𝑖𝑡,𝜎∗
2)
𝑝(ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗ |.)/𝑓𝑁(ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑜 ;ℎ̂𝑖𝑡,𝜎∗
2)
}    (A.14) 
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where 𝑓𝑁(ℎ; ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 , 𝜎∗
2) denotes the density of a univariate normal distribution with mean ℎ̂𝑖𝑡 and 
variance 𝜎∗
2. 
 
Note 
Under (A.2), drawing Π𝑖𝑡
∗  as in (A.11) with using (A.12) is no longer valid. The correct 
conditional posterior distribution in this case is given by: 
𝑝(ℎ𝑖𝑡|. ) ∝ 𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑣
2(ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑟𝑖𝑡)
2−ℎ𝑖𝑡−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 (Π𝑖𝑡−𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡)
2
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 (Π𝑖𝑡−𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡)2
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑤
2 (G𝑖𝑡−𝛾𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡)2
 (A.15) 
where  𝐺𝑖𝑡 = log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡+1
2 − 𝑎0 − 𝑎 log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 − 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿ℎ𝑖𝑡 = log Π𝑖𝑡
∗ . In (A.15) the first two terms of 
the exponential still determine the tail behavior. Therefore, we can still use the proposal in 
(A.11), albeit the Metropolis-Hastings acceptance probability in (A.12) has to be modified as 
follows: 
min {1,
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 (Π𝑖𝑡−𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗
)
2
−
1
2𝜎𝑤
2 (G𝑖𝑡−𝛾𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡
∗
)2
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 (Π𝑖𝑡−𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑜
)
2
−
1
2𝜎𝑤
2 (G𝑖𝑡−𝛾𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑜
)2
}   (A.16) 
 
Part B 
In the presence of systematic expectations, the second equation in (A.1) is modified as: 
Π𝑖𝑡 = Π𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝜉𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝐽𝑖𝑡𝜉𝑖𝑡
−    (A.17) 
where 𝜉𝑖𝑡
+~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜉+
2 ), 𝜉𝑖𝑡
−~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜉−
2 ), 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁1 − 𝜀1,𝑖𝑡     (A.18) 
  𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁2 − 𝜀2,𝑖𝑡       
and  
[
𝜀1,𝑖𝑡
𝜀2,𝑖𝑡
] ~𝒩 ([
0
0
] , [
1 𝜌
𝜌 1
] = Σ)    (A.19) 
with 𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1 ⟺ 𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0, 𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 1 ⟺ 𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0. 
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 Conditionally on 𝜉𝑖𝑡 = (𝜉𝑖𝑡
+, 𝜉𝑖𝑡
−) and (𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝐽𝑖𝑡), we can still draw Π𝑖𝑡
∗  using (A.11) and 
(A.12) or (A.15) and (A.16) with minimal modifications. For example, (A.15) changes to: 
𝑝(ℎ𝑖𝑡|. ) ∝ 𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑣
2(ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑟𝑖𝑡)
2−ℎ𝑖𝑡−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 (Π𝑖𝑡−𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡−𝜇𝑖𝑡)
2
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑤
2 (G𝑖𝑡−𝛾𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡)2
  (A.20) 
where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝜉𝑖𝑡
+ + 𝐽𝑖𝑡𝜉𝑖𝑡
−, and (A.16) is modified in the obvious way. The other posterior 
conditional distributions remain the same. 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝝃𝒊𝒕 
Given 𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝐽𝑖𝑡, Π𝑖𝑡
∗ , and 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , from (A.17) we have: 
𝜉𝑖𝑡
+~𝑁+ (
𝑅𝑖𝑡
+𝜎
𝜉+
2
𝜎
𝜉+
2 +𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 ,
𝜎
𝜉+
2 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2
𝜎
𝜉+
2 +𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 )    (A.21) 
𝜉𝑖𝑡
−~𝑁+ (
𝑅𝑖𝑡
−𝜎𝜉−
2
𝜎𝜉−
2 +𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 ,
𝜎𝜉−
2 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2
𝜎𝜉−
2 +𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 )    (A.22) 
if 𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 1 and zero otherwise, where 𝑅𝑖𝑡
+ = Π𝑖𝑡 − Π𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝜉𝑖𝑡
+. In (A.21) and (A.22) the 𝜉𝑖𝑡
+ and 
𝜉𝑖𝑡
− components are drawn conditional on each other. 
 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝐈𝒊𝒕
∗  and 𝐉𝒊𝒕
∗  
Given parameter vectors 𝐼1 and 𝐼2 in (A.18) and Σ in (A.19) (that is given 𝜌), it is clear that: 
[
𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗
𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ ] ~𝑁 ([
𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁1
𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁2
] , [
1 𝜌
𝜌 1
])    (A.23) 
subject to 𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0 if 𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1 and 𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0 if 𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 1. The requirement is equivalent to drawing 
from a bivariate truncated normal distribution from (A.23). The joint distribution is 
proportional to: 
𝑒
−
1
2(1−𝜌2)
{𝑣1
2+𝑣2
2−2𝜌𝑣1𝑣2}
 
where 𝑣1 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁1, 𝑣2 = 𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁2. Conditionally on 𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗  we have: 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ |𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ ~𝒩(𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁1 + 𝜌(𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁2), 1 − 𝜌
2)   (A.24) 
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𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ |𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ ~𝒩(𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁2 + 𝜌(𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁1), 1 − 𝜌
2) 
subject to 
𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0 if 𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 1, 𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ < 0, otherwise 
𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0 if 𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 1, 𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ < 0, otherwise 
Drawing random numbers from truncated normal distributions (in the positive or negative 
directions) is straightforward. We use acceptance sampling from an exponential distribution 
whose parameter is optimized so that the acceptance rate is maximized (Tsionas, 2000, 2002). 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝜻 = (𝜻𝟏, 𝜻𝟐) 
We adopt the priors: 
𝜁𝑖~𝑁(𝜁?̅? , ?̅?𝑖)     (A.25) 
To derive the required conditional posterior distributions we proceed as follows. Standard 
results for Bayesian multivariate regression yield the following, based on Zellner (1971, pp. 
241-242). Defining: 
𝕐∗ = [
𝐼∗
𝐽∗
] and ℤ = [ 𝑍
𝑍
], where Z is the matrix of regressors 𝑧𝑖𝑡, we have: 
𝕐∗ = ℤ𝜁 + 𝕌     (A.26) 
where 𝐸(𝕌𝕌′) = Σ⨂𝐼𝑛𝑇, Σ = [
1 𝜌
𝜌 1
], from which we obtain: 
𝜁|. ~𝒩(𝜁, ?̂?)     (A.27) 
where  
𝜁 = [ℤ′(Σ−1⨂𝐼𝑛𝑡)ℤ + ?̅?
−1]−1 × [ℤ′(Σ−1⨂𝐼𝑛𝑡)𝕐 + ?̅?
−1𝜁]̅  (A.28) 
?̂? = [ℤ′(Σ−1⨂𝐼𝑛𝑡)ℤ + ?̅?
−1]−1 
𝜁 = [
𝜁1
𝜁2
] , 𝜁 = [
𝜁1
𝜁2
] , ?̂? = [
?̂?1
?̂?2
] 
where Σ and Σ−1 have a particularly simple form. 
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Conditional posterior of 𝝆 
This is given by: 
𝑝(𝜌|. ) ∝ (1 − 𝜌2)−
𝑛𝑡
2 𝑒
−
1
2(1−𝜌2)
[𝑄−2𝑆𝜌]
, −1 < 𝜌 < 1   (A.29) 
where 𝑄 = ∑ ∑ (𝑣1,𝑖𝑡
2 +𝑇𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑣2,𝑖𝑡
2 ), 𝑆 = ∑ ∑ 𝑣1,𝑖𝑡𝑣2,𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 𝑣1,𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁1, and 𝑣2,𝑖𝑡 =
𝐽𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜁2. The maximum ?̂? of (A.29) can be located by standard univariate optimization 
techniques, under the assumption that the prior is: 
𝑝(𝜌) ∝ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡. 1(−1,1)(𝜌)    (A.30) 
Although this is not essential, if the maximum is interior we can compute 𝜎∗
2 = −
1
𝑑2
𝑑𝑝2
log 𝑝(𝑒|.)
 
and propose a draw 𝜌∗~𝑁(ℎ̂, 𝜎∗
2) restricted to the interval (-1, 1). Relative to the existing draw 
𝜌0, the new draw is accepted with Metropolis-Hastings probability: 
min {1,
𝑝(𝜌∗|.)/𝑓𝑁(𝜌∗;?̂?,𝜎∗2)
𝑝(𝜌0|.)/𝑓𝑁(𝜌0;?̂?,𝜎02)
}    (A.31) 
We have not encountered cases where the maximum of (A.29) occurs on the boundary. 
 
Part C 
In this part we take posterior analysis in the class of models defined by VAR: 
log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑎01 + 𝑎11 log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑎21 log 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿1 + 𝑤1,𝑖𝑡 (A.32) 
        log 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎02 + 𝑎12 log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑎22 log 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿2 + 𝑤2,𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = [
𝑤1,𝑖𝑡
𝑤2,𝑖𝑡
] ~𝒩(0, Ω). For all observations we can write the panel VAR in (A.32) as: 
log 𝜎2 = 𝑎01 + 𝑎11 log 𝜎(−1)
2 + 𝑎12 log 𝑢(−1) + 𝛾1Π(−1)
∗ + 𝑧𝛿1 + 𝑤1 (A.33) 
log 𝑢 = 𝑎02 + 𝑎12 log 𝜎(−1)
2 + 𝑎22 log 𝑢(−1) + 𝛾2Π(−1)
∗ + 𝑧𝛿2 + 𝑤2 
which is in the form of multivariate regression as in (A.26) and therefore coefficients 
𝑎0𝑗 , 𝑎𝑖𝑗, 𝛾𝑖, and 𝛿𝑖 can be drawn following the procedure in (A.27) and (A.28). 
 The conditional posterior distribution of Ω is given by: 
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𝑝(Ω−1|. ) ∝ |Ω−1|𝑛𝑡−
3
2 exp(−
1
2
𝑡𝑟𝔸∗Ω−1)   (A.34) 
where 𝔸∗ = 𝕎′𝕎, 𝕍∗ = [
log 𝜎2
log 𝑢2
], 𝕎 = 𝕍∗ − ℤ∗𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅 , assuming (A.33) is written in the 
general form: 
𝕍∗ = ℤ∗𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅 + 𝑊     (A.35) 
The prior 𝑝(Ω−1) ∝ |Ω−1|−3/2 is assumed. Drawing the exponential components 𝜉𝑖𝑡
+ and 𝜉𝑖𝑡
−, 
as in Section B, can be performed without modifications. Drawing the remaining latent 
variables is changed as follows. 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝝈𝒊𝒕
𝟐  
𝑝(ℎ𝑖𝑡|. ) ∝ 𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑣
2(ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑟𝑖𝑡)
2−ℎ𝑖𝑡−
1
2𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 (Π𝑖𝑡−𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡−𝜇𝑖𝑡)
2
  (A.36) 
            𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑤
2 (G𝑖𝑡−𝛾𝑒
ℎ𝑖𝑡)2
𝑒−
1
2(𝕍𝑖𝑡
∗ −ℤ𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅)
′(𝕍𝑖𝑡
∗ −ℤ𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅) 
where 𝕍𝑖𝑡
∗  and ℤ𝑖𝑡
∗  are the typical components of 𝕍∗ and ℤ∗ defined in (A.34) and (A.35). 
Notably: 𝕍∗ = [
log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2
log 𝑢𝑖𝑡
], ℤ∗ = [
1 log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 , log 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 , …
1 log 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 , log 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 , …
] and ℎ𝑖𝑡 ≡ log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 . Our strategy is to 
locate the maximum and Hessian of (A.36) and propose a normal draw, which is accepted 
using the analogous necessary modification of (A.14). 
 
Conditional posterior of 𝒖𝒊𝒕  
This is given by 
𝑝(𝑢𝑖𝑡) ∝ 𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑣
2 (log Π𝑖𝑡
∗ −𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽+𝑢𝑖𝑡)
2
−
1
2𝜎𝑢
2 𝑢𝑖𝑡
2 −log 𝑢𝑖𝑡
  (A.37) 
𝑒−
1
2(𝕍𝑖𝑡
∗ −ℤ𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅)
′Ω−1(𝕍𝑖𝑡
∗ −ℤ𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅)𝑒−
1
2(𝕍𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ −ℤ𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ 𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅)
′Ω−1(𝕍𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ −ℤ𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ 𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅) 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 appears in both 𝕍𝑖𝑡
∗  and ℤ𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ . We use again a Metropolis-Hastings step and the 
model and Hessian of (A.37) as in the previous case of 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 . 
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Conditional posterior of 𝚷𝒊𝒕
∗  
Relative to (A.20) we now have the extra term: 
𝑒−
1
2
(𝕍𝑖𝑡
∗ −ℤ𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅)
′Ω−1(𝕍𝑖𝑡
∗ −ℤ𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝜃𝑉𝐴𝑅)   (A.38) 
and Π𝑖𝑡
∗  appears in ℤ𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ . The most convenient in our case is to propose a draw as in (A.20) 
and use (A.38) or the Metropolis-Hastings acceptance probability relative to the existing draw 
Π𝑖𝑡
∗(0)
. However, a more efficient algorithm resulted by combining (A.20) and (A.38), is to find 
the mode and Hessian and proceed using an overall Metropolis-Hastings step. 
 
Other numerical details 
Our MCMC relies heavily on locating the mode and second derivative for a particular 
conditional posterior, denoted generically by𝑓(𝜃). In all cases, we use a quasi-Newton 
algorithm with numerical derivatives to perform the computation. This is done during the 
transient or burn-in phase, which is tested for convergence using Geweke's (1992) diagnostics. 
After the burn-in, to minimize computational costs we use one Gauss-Newton iteration away 
from the existing draw. In the case of the VAR model in (A.32) we find it more effective to 
maximize jointly with respect to (log 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , log 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , log Π𝑖𝑡
∗ ) and form a joint proposal to 
substitute univariate proposals from (A.36)-(A.38). Relative to the other schemes, this resulted 
in faster convergence and lower autocorrelations at lag 50. Replacing in this case the Gauss-
Newton iteration with an algorithm that relies on full convergence did not provide significantly 
different performance and the results were mixed when the procedures were applied to subsets 
of the original data set. 
 
Appendix B. Computation of Bayes factors 
In the computation of Bayes factors the role of marginal likelihood is critical. If 𝑝(𝜃|𝑌) is a 
kernel posterior distribution, then the marginal likelihood is ℳ(𝑌) = ∫ 𝑝(𝜃|𝑌)𝑑𝜃
Θ
, where 
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𝜃 ∈ Θ ⊆ ℜ𝑝 is a structural parameter vector. For a number of models whose posterior 
distributions are 𝑝𝑚(𝜃|𝑌), 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀, the marginal likelihoods are ℳ𝑚(𝑌) =
∫ 𝑝𝑚(𝜃|𝑌)𝑑𝜃Θ  and the Bayes factors against, say, model 1 are given as: 
𝐵𝐹𝑚 =
ℳ𝑚(𝑌)
ℳ1(𝑌)
, 𝑚 = 2, … , 𝑀 
 In this paper we use two ways to compute Bayes factors. First, following Verdinelli 
and Wasserman (1995), given a model whose posterior distribution is 𝑝(𝛼, 𝛽|𝑌), a restricted 
model corresponding to 𝛼 = 0 can be evaluated based on the Bayes factor given by 𝐵𝐹 =
∫ 𝑝(𝛼=0|𝛽,𝑌)𝑑𝛽
𝑝(𝛼=0)
, where the denominator provides the value of the prior distribution of 𝛼 and the 
numerator can be computed as ∫ 𝑝(𝛼 = 0, 𝛽|𝑌)𝑑𝛽 ≃ 𝑆−1 ∑ 𝑝(𝛼 = 0|𝛽(𝑠), 𝑌)𝑆𝑠=1  given the 
MCMC draws {𝛽(𝑠), 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆}. This approach can be used to test stochastic volatility 
models against their EGARCH counterparts by testing 𝜎𝑤 = 0. 
 This approach cannot be used always for non-nested models.10 In general, the kernel 
posterior distribution has the form 𝑝(𝜃, Λ|𝑌), where 𝜃 ∈ Θ ⊆ ℜ𝑝 is the structural parameter 
vector and Λ denotes the latent variables, like the collection of 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  and 𝑢𝑖𝑡. If all normalizing 
constants are included in the components of the kernel posterior, then we have the 
factorization: 
ℳ(𝑌) = ∫ ∫ 𝑝(𝜃, Λ|𝑌)𝑑𝜃𝑑Λ = ∫ ∫ 𝑝(Λ|𝜃, 𝑌)𝑝(𝜃|𝑌)𝑑𝜃𝑑Λ 
 Often the conditional distributions 𝑝(Λ|𝜃, 𝑌) have a simple form and their normalizing 
constants are available in closed form. From MCMC we have a sequence of draws 
{𝜃(𝑠), Λ(𝑠), 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆}, which converges in distribution to the posterior whose kernel is given 
by 𝑝(𝜃, Λ|𝑌). Therefore, {𝜃(𝑠)} →𝐷 𝑝(𝜃|𝑌). From these results we can approximate the 
marginal likelihood as follows: 
                                                 
10 For a general discussion see DiCiccio et al. (1997). 
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ℳ(𝑌) ≃ 𝑆−1 ∑ ∫ 𝑝(Λ|𝜃(𝑠), 𝑌)𝑑Λ
𝑆
𝑠=1
 
Since the inner integral is not available in closed form, the marginal likelihood is approximated 
as: 
ℳ(𝑌) ≃ 𝑆−1 ∑ 𝑝(Λ∗|𝜃(𝑠), 𝑌)
𝑆
𝑠=1
 
where Λ∗ = 𝑆−1 ∑ Λ(𝑠)𝑆𝑠=1  is the posterior mean of the latent variables, a point of high posterior 
probability mass. This approach makes it possible to approximate marginal likelihoods and 
Bayes factors easily and without large computational costs. 
 
Appendix C. Results from additional sensitivity tests 
In the tables of this Appendix, we report the results from additional sensitivity tests on the 
VAR model. In Tables C1 and C2, we include more variables (measured at the bank-year level) 
in the vector z in equations (6) and (7). Specifically, we use size (measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets), liquidity (the ratio of liquid assets to total assets), provisions (the 
ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans) and market share (the ratio of a bank’s assets to the 
total bank assets in a given state). In Tables C3 and C4, we use the Fourier functional form 
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Table C1 
Empirical results from the VAR model with additional variables 
included as z in equations (6) and (7): Profit function 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  0.542 0.020 0.211 0.010 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 0.302 0.112 0.212 0.002 
𝑙𝑜𝑔Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  0.148 0.020 0.106 0.122 
Time trend 0.012 0.005 -0.030 0.014 
EQ/TA 0.068 0.039 0.169 0.002 
Size 0.105 0.091 0.014 0.011 
Liquidity -0.047 0.010 0.125 0.048 
Provisions 0.081 0.008 0.018 0.003 
Market share 0.040 0.059 -0.022 0.038 
u 0.115 0.046   
Notes: The table reports the results (posterior mean and standard deviation) 
obtained from the estimation of equations (4)-(7) using Bayesian maximum 
likelihood and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. We report only the results from 
the determinants of stochastic volatility σ and inefficiency u, i.e. equations 
(6)-(7). We estimate a profit function and the functional form for (4) is the 
translog.  
 
 
Table C2 
Empirical results from the VAR model with additional variables 
included as z in equations (6) and (7): Return function 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  0.419 0.019 0.294 0.015 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 0.511 0.123 0.389 0.017 
𝑙𝑜𝑔Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  0.201 0.039 0.148 0.185 
Time trend 0.008 0.009 -0.011 0.046 
EQ/TA 0.095 0.015 0.082 0.021 
Size 0.081 0.090 0.009 0.018 
Liquidity -0.035 0.027 0.111 0.061 
Provisions 0.070 0.006 0.023 0.005 
Market share 0.030 0.061 -0.016 0.090 
u 0.180 0.041   
Notes: The table reports the results (posterior mean and standard deviation) 
obtained from the estimation of equations (4)-(7) using Bayesian maximum 
likelihood and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. We report only the results from 
the determinants of stochastic volatility σ and inefficiency u, i.e. equations 
(6)-(7). We estimate a return function and the functional form for (4) is the 
translog.  
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Table C3 
Empirical results from the VAR model: Profit function (Fourier) 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  0.510 0.016 0.194 0.008 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 0.320 0.129 0.183 0.002 
𝑙𝑜𝑔Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  0.103 0.021 0.093 0.140 
Time trend 0.009 0.006 -0.027 0.016 
EQ/TA 0.073 0.036 0.152 0.002 
u 0.125 0.040   
Notes: The table reports the results (posterior mean and standard deviation) 
obtained from the estimation of equations (4)-(7) using Bayesian maximum 
likelihood and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. We report only the results from 
the determinants of stochastic volatility σ and inefficiency u, i.e. equations 
(6)-(7). We estimate a profit function and the functional form for (4) is the 
translog.  
 
 
Table C4 
Empirical results from the VAR model: Return function (Fourier) 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  0.487 0.014 0.301 0.009 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 0.482 0.105 0.452 0.019 
𝑙𝑜𝑔Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  0.169 0.022 0.126 0.215 
Time trend 0.006 0.010 -0.009 0.025 
EQ/TA 0.089 0.010 0.082 0.020 
u 0.188 0.044   
Notes: The table reports the results (posterior mean and standard deviation) 
obtained from the estimation of equations (4)-(7) using Bayesian maximum 
likelihood and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. We report only the results from 
the determinants of stochastic volatility σ and inefficiency u, i.e. equations 
(6)-(7). We estimate a return function and the functional form for (4) is the 
translog.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
logΠ 9.16 9.01 1.31 1.09 15.57 
logV 0.21 0.20 0.30 -5.57 3.58 
log𝑤1 2.25 2.19 0.68 -0.17 5.56 
log𝑤2 2.63 2.58 0.61 0.69 4.54 
log𝑤3 1.10 1.17 0.43 -0.24 2.20 
log𝑦1 13.70 13.35 1.19 5.12 20.29 
log𝑦2 12.50 12.33 1.37 1.54 19.22 
EQ/TA 11.71 11.36 1.15 7.92 18.44 
Number of obs. 15,922 15,922 15,922 15,922 15,922 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in 
the empirical analysis. All variables are in natural logarithms. Π is profits 
before taxes; V is the ratio of total revenue to total cost; w1 is the ratio of 
expenditures on fixed assets to premises and fixed assets; w2 is the ratio 
of personnel salaries divided by the number of full-time equivalent 
employees; w3 is interest expenses on deposits and interest expenses on 
fed funds divided by the sum of total deposits and fed funds purchased; 
y1 is total loans; y2 is total securities; and EQ/TA is the ratio of total 
equity to total assets. 
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Table 2 
Posterior results from the basic model for the 
volatility equation 
 Profit function Return function 
 Posterior 
mean 
Posterior 
s.d. 
Posterior 
mean 
Posterior 
s.d. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  0.214 0.098 0.121 0.015 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 0.324 0.120 0.518 0.102 
𝑙𝑜𝑔Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  0.131 0.057 0.044 0.002 
Time trend 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.013 
EQ/TA 0.040 0.032 0.007 0.022 
u 0.147 0.035 0.171 0.107 
JB test 0.302 0.415 
Notes: The table reports the results (posterior mean and 
standard deviation) obtained from the estimation of 
equations (4)-(6) using Bayesian maximum likelihood and 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo. We report only the results 
from the determinants of stochastic volatility σ, i.e. 
equation (6). We estimate models by alternatively using 
profit and return functions. The functional form for (4) is 
the translog. The variables are defined in Table 1 and u 
represents inefficiency. JB test is the p-value of the Jarque-
Bera tests for normality.  
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Table 3 
Empirical results from the VAR model: Profit function 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  0.617 0.022 0.221 0.011 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 0.315 0.116 0.225 0.002 
𝑙𝑜𝑔Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  0.151 0.026 0.117 0.116 
Time trend 0.011 0.004 -0.032 0.012 
EQ/TA 0.071 0.043 0.181 0.001 
u 0.117 0.048   
JB test 0.364 0.259 
Notes: The table reports the results (posterior mean and standard deviation) 
obtained from the estimation of equations (4)-(7) using Bayesian maximum 
likelihood and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. We report only the results from 
the determinants of stochastic volatility σ and inefficiency u, i.e. equations 
(6)-(7). We estimate a profit function and the functional form for (4) is the 
translog. The variables are defined in Table 1 and u represents inefficiency. 
JB test is the p-value of the Jarque-Bera tests for normality. 
 
44 
 
 
Table 4 
Empirical results for the VAR model: Return function 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
posterior 
mean 
posterior 
s.d. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  0.453 0.014 0.315 0.017 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 0.556 0.104 0.401 0.015 
𝑙𝑜𝑔Π𝑖,𝑡−1
∗  0.212 0.026 0.155 0.201 
Time trend 0.009 0.007 -0.013 0.038 
EQ/TA 0.102 0.021 0.077 0.025 
u 0.185 0.124   
JB test 0.484 0.360 
Notes: The table reports the results (posterior mean and standard deviation) 
obtained from the estimation of equations (4)-(7) using Bayesian maximum 
likelihood and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. We report only the results from 
the determinants of stochastic volatility σ and inefficiency u, i.e. equations 
(6)-(7). We estimate a return function and the functional form for (4) is the 
translog. The variables are defined in Table 1 and u represents inefficiency. 
JB test is the p-value of the Jarque-Bera tests for normality. 
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Figure 1 
Annual averages of downside risk from the profit and return VAR models 
 
 
